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Abstract This paper reconstructs an Indian Buddhist response to the
overdemandingness objection, the claim that a moral theory asks too much of
its adherents. In the first section, I explain the objection and argue that some
Mahāyāna Buddhists, including Śāntideva, face it. In the second section, I
survey some possible ways of responding to the objection as a way of situating
the Buddhist response alongside contemporary work. In the final section, I draw
upon writing by Vasubandhu and Śāntideva in reconstructing a Mahāyāna
response to the objection. An essential component of this response is the
psychological transformation that the bodhisattva achieves as a result of realiz-
ing the nonexistence of the self. This allows him to radically identify his well-
being with the well-being of others, thereby lessening the tension between self
and others upon which the overdemandingness objection usually depends.
Emphasizing the attention Mahāyāna authors pay to lessening moral demand-
ingness in this way increases our appreciation of the philosophical sophistica-
tion of their moral thought and highlights an important strategy for responding
to the overdemandingness objection that has been underdeveloped in contem-
porary work.
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While contemporary moral theorists like Peter Singer and Peter Unger insist that
morality tells us that we should donate surplus income saved from forgoing afternoon
matinees and ski vacations, the bodhisattva of Indian Buddhism prays to be reborn in
the Avīci hell to save the beings there.1 For those unfamiliar with Indian cosmology, in
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the Avīci hell, fires from all directions slowly burn away the skin and bones of beings
that dwell there for billions of years (Tsong-Kha-Pa 2000).2 Bodhisattvas undergo this
and many other torments as they voluntarily delay final liberation from suffering for
countless lives in order to develop the full virtues of Buddhahood and liberate other
sentient beings.3 Although moral theories are expected to require some level of self-
sacrifice, if a theory is extremely demanding, then it opens itself to the charge that it
asks too much of its followers. Any Buddhist thinker who claims that we are obligated
to become bodhisattvas will face this overdemandingness objection.
In this essay, I consider the resources that Buddhist authors possess to respond to this
objection. In the first section, I explain what the overdemandingness objection is and
argue that it applies to the Mahāyāna Buddhist monk, Śāntideva. In the following
section, I sketch possible strategies that may be employed in responding to the
objection and suggest which kind of response a Buddhist like Śāntideva would make.
The concluding section reconstructs one such response that depends on recognizing the
psychological transformation that early Buddhists and Mahāyāna practitioners alike
undergo as a result of practicing the Buddhist path. I also argue that the demand-
lessening strategy employed in Mahāyāna Buddhist texts is plausible, but that it
depends on Buddhist presuppositions about the psychological effects of realizing
selflessness and the pervasion of ordinary experience by suffering (duh
˙
kha) to have
the level of effect Buddhist authors require.
The Overdemandingness Objection in Indian Buddhism
The overdemandingness objection arises when a moral theory makes unfair demands
on its adherents. The most influential version of the problem occurs when a theory asks
the agent to make an unfair sacrifice of her well-being. Although there are other ways
of formulating the problem, it is only this central version that I will be concerned with.4
The overdemandingness problem is most commonly associated with act consequen-
tialism, since an act consequentialist will sacrifice her well-being whenever doing so
would maximize welfare overall. Ethical theories other than consequentialism, howev-
er, can also face the overdemandingness objection, such as a virtue ethics or deontology
that endorses potentially demanding habitual dispositions or rules.5 Since it can apply to
2 See also the discussion of the hell realms in Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam. See Vasubandhu 1988,
pps. 456–460.
3 The bodhisattva is the saint of Indian Buddhism who delays final liberation from suffering and takes
innumerable rebirths in order to develop the wisdom and compassion necessary to become a Buddha and
lead sentient beings from suffering. Although early Buddhism accepts the existence of bodhisattvas, the ideal
gains much greater prominence in the later, Mahāyāna traditions.
4 The overdemandingness objection is often linked to Bernard Williams’ claim that Utilitarianism alienates us
from our life projects by requiring us to abandon them whenever doing so would promote the good (Williams
1973). Moral theories are also sometimes said to be unfairly demanding if they severely narrow the range of
options open to the agent (Murphy 2000, 26) or require an agent to make sacrifices, even when all things
considered they have most reason not to do so (Portmore 2011, 26). To the extend that these formulations do
not depend on a loss of agent well-being, I think it better to treat them as distinct problems, rather than group
them under the overdemandingness objection, but I will not argue for that here. The welfare-reducing version
of the objection is the most relevant to Buddhist demand-lessening strategies, and so I limit my attention to it.
5 See Swanton (2009) regarding demanding virtue ethics. See Singer (1972) for an argument that common-
sense morality can be overly demanding.
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versions of most moral theories, we need not consider what kind of moral theory
Buddhism represents before considering its vulnerability to the overdemandingness
objection.
Early Indian Buddhism accepts two end goals of spiritual practice, becoming an
arhat who eliminates ignorance and craving, and upon death, is not reborn, or
becoming a full Buddha by adopting the path of the bodhisattva who willingly delays
final nirvāṇa and takes practically limitless additional rebirths for the benefit of sentient
beings.6 The life of a monastic seeking arhatship seems demanding by non-Buddhist
standards: monks and nuns forgo family life and accept the rules of monastic discipline
(vinaya) which include not eating after noon, not handling money, and avoiding
musical shows and dancing. Early Buddhism does not face the overdemandingness
problem as I have defined it, however, since undertaking these apparent hardships help
the monk or nun attain nirvāṇa and be released from suffering.7 Therefore, according to
Buddhists, the apparent demandingness of the practice actually increases the well-being
of the individual.
In contrast to aiming at arhatship, becoming a bodhisattva is demanding in the sense
I am interested in, since the aspiring bodhisattva delays nirvāṇa and the release from
suffering it represents.8 Further, they perform many demanding acts, including giving
up their limbs or even their lives to benefit others and being reborn in hell realms to
work for the beings there. Although the bodhisattva ideal gains greater prominence
with the development of Mahāyāna Buddhism, most Mahāyāna authors also claim that
arhatship is an acceptable, if inferior endpoint of spiritual practice.9 In contrast to early
Buddhist texts, which view the bodhisattva ideal of attaining full Buddhahood as
beyond the ability of most persons, these Mahāyāna authors emphasize the possibility
and desirability of all persons becoming bodhisattvas and eventually Buddhas. For this
reason, they need to produce strategies that lessen the demandingness of the bodhisatt-
va path, so that it is accessible to ordinary persons. Nevertheless, since undertaking the
bodhisattva way is optional, they also do not face the overdemandingness objection.
On the other hand, in his Introduction to the Practice of Awakening
(Bodhicaryāvatāra; hereafter, BCA), the Mahāyāna monk philosopher Śāntideva
makes a series of arguments in which he concludes that we should commit to impartial
benevolence and remove everyone’s suffering without partiality. For instance, in the
eighth chapter, he writes:
I should eliminate the suffering of others because it is suffering, just like my own
suffering. I should take care of others because they are sentient beings, just as I
6 Arhat in Sanskrit means worthy one and refers to the early Buddhist practitioner who has attained the
nirvāna of individual liberation.
7 In addition, early Buddhist traditions hold the bodhisattva path to be an optional supererogatory commitment
and so would not face the overdemandingess objection.
8 In many early Buddhist texts, the liberation of an arhat and a Buddha is not clearly distinguished. As both
Mahāyāna and early Buddhist traditions develop, however, the awakening of a Buddha is distinguished from
that of an arhat in that he completely destroys the defilements (āśravas) of ignorance (avidyā) and develops
various powers to effectively benefit sentient beings. To develop these advanced abilities, the bodhisattva
voluntarily enters the longer path to full Buddhahood and delays liberation even after realizing selflessness.
See Nattier (2003) and Bodhi (2010).
9 See Nattier (2003), especially pps. 172–176. Also relevant are Harrison (1987), Samuels (1997), and Silk
(2002).
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am a sentient being (BCA 8:94). When happiness is equally dear to others and
myself, then what is so special about me that I strive after happiness for myself
alone? (BCA 8:95). When fear and suffering are equally abhorrent to others and
myself, then what is so special about me that I protect myself but not others?
(BCA 8:96)10
The argument appeals to the intrinsic unpleasantness of suffering as a reason to
remove it, no matter within whom it occurs. Śāntideva suggests that there is nothing
about my own suffering or happiness that justifies giving it any special priority. The
implied conclusion is that I should accept impartial benevolence and commit to
removing everyone’s suffering without giving special concern to my own. For a
Buddhist like Śāntideva, this would mean committing to the bodhisattva path, since
it is by perfecting the virtues of Buddhahood that we would become most effective in
removing suffering.11
I do not want to here evaluate this argument, but cite it to show that Śāntideva
attempts to establish that we ought to become bodhisattvas. Moreover, as we have seen,
the bodhisattva path is, at least at first glance, extraordinarily demanding. Unlike the
arhat who enters personal nirvāṇa and escapes all suffering, the bodhisattva willingly
takes billions of additional rebirths, often undergoing torments in his quest to liberate
sentient beings. These verses, therefore, may be taken as evidence that Śāntideva, and
Mahāyāna Buddhists who would follow him in accepting an obligation to commit to
impartial benevolence, would face the overdemandingness problem. If we believe it
unfair for a moral system to insist we give up movies and vacations, surely it is too
much to ask that we remain for countless eons in sam
˙
sāra!
We can conclude that most Mahāyāna authors have an interest in reducing the
demandingness of the bodhisattva path and that at least Śāntideva appears to actually
face the overdemandingness objection. In the next section, I survey possible responses
to the objection and indicate in a preliminary way what type of response is open to
Buddhist Mahāyāna authors. The following section reconstructs in more detail the
response Śāntideva and other Mahāyānists can make to the objection.
Possible Responses to the Overdemandingness Objection
The most straightforward response to the overdemandingness objection is to simply
claim that the correct moral theory is extremely demanding. Versions of this bite-the-
bullet response have been adopted by prominent ethicists including Shelly Kagan, Peter
Singer, and Peter Unger. Generally, this approach is matched with a campaign against
the intuitions which lead us to believe that the demands of the theory in question are
10 Translations from Śāntideva’s BCA are from Śāntideva (1997), translation by Vesna Wallace and Alan
Wallace unless otherwise indicated.
11 A few verses later, Śāntideva also makes an argument that if we accept the nonexistence of the self, then we
should commit to impartially removing the suffering of all. See BCA 8: 101–103. In Harris (2011), I argue that
the primary purpose of these verses may be to act as a meditation that causes psychological transformation,
rather than to rationally convince. But as Garfield et al. (in press) emphasize, even if I am right about the
meditative purpose of these verses, this does not mean that they should not also be taken seriously as an
argument. I adopt this approach to verses 8:94–96 here.
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unfair. 12 This approach is not really available to the Mahāyānist, however. The
difficulty is that endorsing an extremely demanding theory generally requires accepting
that most persons will not do what is morally required.13 Singer, for instance, argues
that although we are morally required to give up all our free time and income to help
relieve poverty, it is only realistic to expect most persons to make a far smaller
contribution (Singer 1993, 358). The goal of a Mahāyānist like Śāntideva, however,
is to help all beings achieve full Buddhahood for the sake of all sentient beings. This
suggests Śāntideva will need to offer some response to the overdemandingness objec-
tion that actually lessens demandingness, rather than merely endorse a standard of
rightness that most persons will not follow.
A second kind of response to the objection, which has received considerable
attention from authors writing from a consequentialist perspective, is to restructure a
moral theory to lessen the amount owed to others. Although theoretically this
restructuring might take place on either the criteria of right action or the theory of
well-being endorsed by the system, in fact most contemporary approaches have focused
on the first of these options. Michael Slote’s satisficing consequentialism, for instance,
decouples consequentialism from maximization and claims that although consequences
alone determine the rightness of an act, an act may still be right if it does not have the
best consequences (Slote 1985, 36). An agent in Slote’s view fulfills his ethical
obligations if his action is good enough, even if it is not as good as it could be.
Likewise, Samuel Scheffler abandons the consequentialist commitment to impartiality
and allows agents to give their own interests greater weight than that of other persons
(Scheffler 1982). Adherents of rule consequentialism, similarly, lessen the demands
placed on adherents by determining individual obligation by the set of rules which
would be most beneficial if followed by everyone.14 A Mahāyāna Buddhist claiming
that the bodhisattva path is obligatory cannot adopt this kind of demand-lessening
restructuring of the criteria of right action, however, because to do so would require
making optional the bodhisattva’s primary commitment, the achievement of full Bud-
dhahood in order to liberate all sentient beings from suffering. The bodhisattva vow
requires the bodhisattva to devote all his resources and energy towards awakening as a
means of liberating all sentient beings, and any diminution of this goal would mean
abandoning this supreme intention.
Although it has been a less popular option, it is also possible to alter a theory of well-
being to reduce the tension between moral demands and an individual’s welfare. Three
theories about the basic units of welfare value have been particularly prominent in
recent contemporary ethical theory. Mental state theories, like hedonism, claim that
welfare consists solely in experiencing certain psychological states. A desire-
satisfaction theory, by contrast, claims that our life goes best when we satisfy our
12 See Kagan 1989, p. 13; Singer 1972, 1993; Unger 1996.
13 See Goodman 2009, chapter 7 for an exploration of several ways Buddhist moral texts function to reduce
moral demandingness, including distinguishing moral praise and blame from moral wrongdoing and adopting
a two-tiered level of moral obligation for extraordinary and ordinary persons. Both these strategies can be seen
as a response to the problem referred to here that most persons will not follow an extraordinarily demanding
moral code. These strategies identified by Goodman are complimentary to the one I develop below, but would
perhaps be less attractive to a thinker like Śāntideva who goes to extraordinary lengths to urge his reader to
aspire towards complete moral perfection.
14 Hooker (2000) provides a carefully constructed defense of rule consequentialism. See Mulgan (2001)
chapters three, five, and six for an accessible summary of rule, satisficing, and hybrid consequentialism.
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desires. An objective list theory claims that certain items enhance our welfare, regard-
less of whether they bring us pleasure or satisfy our desires. This list might include such
items as friendships, appreciation of beauty, and character development, and might also
include items focused on by the other theories, such as pleasure and desire satisfaction.
15 Other theories of well-being have also been defended, but considering these three
influential views will be sufficient for my purpose.16
In this welfare restructuring response, the strategy will be to endorse an
alternative theory of welfare that will define the foundational units of well-
being in terms that lessen apparent demandingness. A Christian objective list
theory, for instance, might claim that closeness to God is the most significant
element in individual well-being and devalue items such as pleasure or satis-
faction of worldly aims. This is largely the strategy we find in early Buddhist
texts that devalue worldly pursuits and claim most forms of sensual pleasure
are pervaded by subtle dissatisfaction. As a result, the life of the monk who has
forgone family and material comforts is held to be the best available for the
monk himself.17
This strategy, alone, cannot provide an adequate response to the
overdemandingness objection facing a Mahāyānist like Śāntideva, however. This
is because the bodhisattva undergoes severe torments in numerous rebirths as
part of his training and the activities he undergoes to aid sentient beings.
Further, all Buddhists accept that suffering is bad. Although the Mahāyānist
can claim the bodhisattva suffers no deprivation from renouncing sam˙sa¯ric
pursuits, she still seems to face the overdemandingness objection if she claims
that an individual is obligated to undergo these difficulties, rather than aim for
personal liberation from suffering.
There is, however, another kind of response to the overdemandingness
objection that reduces the tension between benevolence and self-interest by
closely linking the well-being of self and others. This option is really a
demand-lessening strategy, compatible with multiple normative theories, rather
than a restructuring of any particular theory of well-being. The strategy here is
to leave the theory of well-being intact, while emphasizing psychological
transformation to bring an individual’s interests into line with what the theory
demands.18 For instance, a sense of joy at giving might be nurtured which,
15 Parfit (1984, 403–407) offers an influential discussion of these three theories which is often taken as a
starting point for considering what theory of welfare is correct. See also Heathwood (2010) for a good
introductory discussion.
16 Other influential views about well-being are developed in Sumner (1996) and Darwall (2002). As I will
explain below, almost any plausible theory of well-being will give importance to either desire satisfaction or
experiencing certain mental states. Since the Buddhist demand-lessening strategy developed below focuses on
these, it will be compatible with any of these theories.
17 I do not, however, think that early Buddhism commits itself to any foundational theory of well-being and
therefore technically it would not represent a version of this strategy. Early Buddhist texts, I believe, argue that
commonly held items of value are actually pervaded by suffering, but they do not specify at the deepest level
what it is that welfare value consists of. See Harris (2014) for a consideration of the relationship between
Buddhist understandings of suffering (duh
˙
kha) and theories of well-being.
18 The possibility of using psychological transformation as a means of reducing demandingness has been
raised by Nagel (1986), 205–207; Scheffler (1992), 128–9; and Hooker (1996), 144.
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under hedonic theories of well-being, will help balance out any loss of well-
being from making significant charitable contributions. For a desire-satisfaction
theorist, the strategy will be to over time eliminate self-regarding desires, like
achieving personal success, and replace them with desires for the well-being of
others. Since most plausible objective list theories will include either desire
satisfaction or at least certain kinds of pleasure as elements of what makes a
life go well, this same strategy applies to these types of theories as well.
It is this kind of demand-lessening strategy, focused on gradually shaping
psychological response, that I will argue is to be found in Buddhist texts.
Before doing so, I need to note an important feature of this approach, which
is that it is not tied to any particular theory of well-being. This is because
there is relatively broad agreement among theories about the welfare increas-
ing value of certain kinds of psychological states. Almost any plausible theory
of well-being will give importance to at least some pleasurable mental states,
as well as the satisfaction of some desires. Theories will differ, of course,
about what at the deepest level explains this increase to well-being. A
hedonism will claim that the satisfaction of desire is valuable because it
creates pleasure, while a desire-satisfaction theory will claim that pleasure is
valuable because we desire it. Objective list theories might take one or both
of these items as having intrinsic value. Therefore, as long as the psycholog-
ical transformation strategy focuses on these commonly accepted items of
value, it will be compatible with multiple foundational theories of well-being.
Of course, there may be some disagreement about which kinds of pleasure or
satisfied desires have welfare increasing value, and so adaptations to the
strategy might still be necessary. Since it is compatible with multiple theories
of well-being, I will not have to address the tendentious issue of which (if
any) foundational theory of well-being Buddhist authors commit to in order to
illustrate their use of this strategy.
A Buddhist Response to the Overdemandingness Objection
As far as I know, there is no Buddhist text that explicitly formulates and
responds to the overdemandingness objection. One of the authors to come close
to doing so is Vasubandhu, in his Commentary to the Treasury of Higher
Doctrine, or Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam, where he considers the question of
why anyone would take on the incredibly difficult task of becoming a bodhi-
sattva. Vasubandhu’s concern is to show that it is psychologically possible to
adopt the bodhisattva path, and he is not trying to show how benefiting others
also benefits the bodhisattva and lessens demandingness. Nevertheless, after
considering Vasubandhu’s comments, I will argue that they help us to under-
stand how several elements of a Buddhist response to the overdemandingness
objection would go.
For what reason do they undertake the effort? They make the effort for the
welfare of others, so they would become able to rescue others from the great
flood of suffering.
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How does the welfare of others benefit them? Since they desire the welfare of
others, it is their own welfare.19
Vasubandhu claims that bodhisattvas are willing to undertake the demanding task of
becoming buddhas because they identify their own well-being with the well-being of
others.20 As I will develop below, this is an example of the psychological transforma-
tion demand-lessening strategy described in the last section. Many of us have this kind
of attitude towards our children or close friends and family; a parent will herself
flourish when her child flourishes, even if this requires undertaking hardships for the
child’s well-being. What is astounding is that the bodhisattva takes this attitude towards
all sentient beings, including strangers. Here, we might wonder how this is even
psychologically possible. Vasubandhu continues:
Some people take delight in the pain of others because they lack compassion as a
result of always focusing on their own welfare. Likewise, [bodhisattvas] take
delight in doing actions for the welfare of others, since they lack all concern about
themselves, because of repeatedly feeling compassion. Just as those who are
ignorant of the mark of conditionality of conditioned selfless elements, who by
the power of repeated practice have become settled in attachment to the self,
endure suffering because of this [self]. Likewise, [bodhisattvas], after eliminating
attachment towards the self arising from these [erroneously grasped selfless
elements], through the power of repeated practice, increase concern for others
and endure suffering on account of them. The family [of bodhisattvas] comes
from another lineage which experiences suffering because others suffer, and
happiness because other are happy, not from their own happiness.21
In the above passage, Vasubandhu links the selfish attitudes persons obsessed with
their own welfare display, to ignorance about the selfless and conditioned nature of the
elements making up the conventional person. In other words, the selfishness of



























tasyābhimatatvāt| Vasubandhu (1998) p. 430; 3:93–94. See also the English translation by Pruden in
Vasubandhu (1988) p. 480–81. The reference to desire might be taken to suggest Vasubandhu ascribes to a
desire-satisfaction theory of well-being, but I think this is too quick. It is compatible with this quote to hold
that Buddhists are hedonists who hold satisfaction of desire is valuable since it brings pleasure. Other theories
of well-being might also be defended. My point is that mentioning satisfaction of desire provides little
evidence for a particular foundational theory of well-being, since most theories will give some value to the
satisfaction of desires.
20 See also Vasubandhu’s commentary to the Universal Vehicle Discourse Literature (Mahāyānasūtrālam
˙
kāra):
‘When suffering must be endured, the bodhisattva will be able to find pleasure even in that suffering, as it serves
as the cause of helping others’ (Thurman 2004, p. 209).
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khāyate sukhena sukhāyate, nātmana iti| Vasubandhu (1998) p. 430; 3:93–94.
See also the English translation by Pruden in Vasubandhu (1988) p. 481.
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enduring and self-subsisting selves. The reason bodhisattvas are psychologically able to
care more for strangers than they do for themselves is that they have overcome this
belief in an enduring self. Here, we should remember that Buddhists hold that there is
no enduring self (ātman) that grounds our identity, but rather that ‘person’ is merely a
conventional designation (prajñapti) we give to mental and physical events in close
causal interaction, what Vasubandhu calls ‘the conditioned elements,’ that account for
human experience. Further, they claim that our egoistic concern is rooted in
misidentifying this impermanent conventionally existing self as an enduring unitary
self that is not dependent on conventional labeling for its existence. A low-level
bodhisattva overcomes the intellectual mistake of believing that any of these mental
or physical events are, or belong to an enduring self, thereby greatly lessening
selfishness. At the higher stages of the path, the bodhisattva weakens, and finally
eliminates the much more deeply rooted psychological tendency to identify as being or
possessing an enduring self. At this latter stage, his egoistic selfishness is destroyed.22
According to Vasubandhu, then, accepting the nonexistence of any enduring inde-
pendent self has two related psychological effects that explain how it is psychologically
possible for bodhisattvas to commit so radically to the welfare of others. First, the
elimination of the belief in self lessens self-cherishing, making it easier for the
bodhisattva in training to give up his possessions and even his life for others. Second,
the destruction of the belief in an enduring self results in an extreme psychological
flexibility, which allows the bodhisattva to radically identify his well-being with the
well-being of others. Unlike most of us, who can only deeply do this with close friends
and family, the bodhisattva takes the well-being of everyone in the whole universe as
his goal.
In the Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam, Vasubandhu is writing from the perspective of
early Buddhism that holds arhatship is an acceptable goal, and he does not claim that
destroying the innate belief in self will necessarily lead one to become a bodhisattva.
His remarks here are distinct from Śāntideva’s arguments that we are obligated to
commit to impartial benevolence and accept the bodhisattva path. Further, his goal is
not to argue that the bodhisattva path is not overly demanding, but to show how it is
psychologically possible for one to undertake its difficulties. Nevertheless, his com-
ments suggest how a successful Mahāyāna response to the overdemandingness objec-
tion might go.
There are two essential steps to this response. The first is to recall that both an early
Buddhist disciple aiming at arhatship and a Mahāyānist on the bodhisattva path will
weaken and finally destroy the belief in an enduring self. Not just a bodhisattva, but
22 As Mahāyāna Buddhism develops, a scheme of ten stages is adopted that the bodhisattva is said to progress
through on his way to full Buddhahood. Upon entering the first stage, the bodhisattva overcomes the
pernicious view called satkāya-dṣr
˙
ti, or personality belief, in which the self is held to be identical to,
possessing, contained within or containing one or more of the five aggregates of matter, feeling, recognition,
compositional factors, and consciousness which comprise a person’s experience. At this point, the intellectual
belief in an enduring self has been eliminated. The psychological tendency to identify oneself as an enduring
self, called asmimāna, or the conceit ‘I am’ is not eliminated till much later, although accounts vary as to
exactly when this happens. Selfishness is not eliminated until conceit is destroyed, but weakens as the
bodhisattva progresses along the path. See Collins 1982, pps. 93–95 on the difference between satkāya-dṣr
˙
ti
and asmimāna. See Gethin 1998, pps. 187–198 and Williams 2009, chapter 9, for the explanations of the ten
stages of the bodhisattva path. Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting I distinguish between the
intellectual and psychological aspects of anātman.
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also a disciple approaching arhatship, will experience a radical lessening of ego
grasping as he approaches his goal. As suggested in the second quotation from
Vasubandhu, this means that they will have eliminated the grasping after one’s own
welfare that results from the erroneous belief in the self.
Further, we should recall that for a Buddhist, accepting any version of the Buddhist
path will always be better for the individual than remaining content to stay in sam
˙
sāra.
Even the difficulties of the bodhisattva path will be less than the eternal torments of
continual death and rebirth.
Taken together, these claims entail that the demandingness of the bodhisattva path
should be assessed, not from the standpoint of one standing outside the Buddhist path,
but from the standpoint of the disciple nearing arhatship who has destroyed all but the
subtlest remains of her innate self-grasping. This is because Buddhists hold that it is in
everyone’s interest to aim at either arhatship or take up the bodhisattva path to full
Buddhahood, and both these endpoints require eliminating belief in a self. The relevant
question, then, is not how demanding would the bodhisattva path be for us, but rather
how demanding would it be for the advanced Buddhist practitioner.
A general principle that applies here is that demandingness in the welfare decreasing
sense may increase or decrease depending upon the resources possessed by an indi-
vidual. Consider the classic example of giving surplus income to charity. A moral
theory that only required a donation manageable relative to my level of income is
unlikely to be too demanding. Moreover, as overall income increases, the amount that
can be asked increases as well. Similar claims could be made about other demanding
situations, such as whether a person is obligated to rescue a child in a burning house. If
it is likely that I will be badly hurt in the attempted rescue, it may be counterintuitive to
claim that I am required to attempt it. A former firefighter in great physical shape,
however, might have only a small chance of being injured if she attempted the rescue.
Intuitively, we would probably not think it too demanding if a moral theory required her
to do so.23
What this shows is that as resources increase, which in these examples include
material goods and physical abilities, the amount of well-being that is lost as a result of
aiding others may decrease. Since the version of the overdemandingness objection I am
considering depends on an unfair loss of well-being, this means that individuals with
greater resources are less likely to experience unfairly demanding losses of well-being
as a result of moral demands. The relevant Buddhist point stressed in these passages by
Vasubandhu is that the resources in question here can also be psychological. Because of
her mental training, the Buddhist practitioner advanced in the knowledge of selflessness
experiences a far smaller decrease in well-being than the ordinary person undergoing
the same apparent hardships.
In fact authors like Śāntideva take into account this difference in psychological
resources between early and later stage bodhisattvas in their structuring of the bodhi-
sattva path. Śāntideva forbids bodhisattvas from sacrificing their lives until they have
perfected generosity (BCA 5:87). Instead, he recommends that early-stage bodhisattvas
give away vegetables to prepare their minds for greater sacrifices in the future (BCA
7:25–26). Moreover, early-stage bodhisattvas, like disciples of the early Buddhist path,
23 Relevant here is Moss 2011, p. 85.
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will focus on eliminating their innate belief in self before taking on demanding tasks to
aid others. As this innate belief is lessened, both disciples and bodhisattvas undergo a
psychological transformation in which clinging to one’s own welfare is radically
reduced. At this point, committing to take on additional rebirths for the welfare of
others would be much less of a hardship. The early Buddhist disciple aiming at
arhatship, here, is analogous to the former firefighter; although not currently committed
to rescuing other beings, the task of doing so would be far less demanding for a high-
level disciple than for one without advanced Buddhist training.
The first stage of this reconstructed Buddhist response to the overdemandingness
problem, then, is to note that the demandingness of the Buddhist path should be
assessed from the perspective of a highly advanced practitioner who has realized
selflessness. The second stage is to detail the demand-reducing benefits accruing to a
bodhisattva who has achieved this realization. Here, as illustrated by our look at the
passages by Vasubandhu, we find two sets of benefits, both of which fall under the
psychological transformation demand-lessening strategy introduced in the prior section.
First, as mentioned above, destroying the false belief in an enduring self eliminates
deeply rooted grasping after one’s own interests. This means that desires for one’s own
prosperity, as well as mental aversion against contributing to others’ welfare, will be
reduced. Since most plausible theories of well-being will give some value to lessening
mental suffering, or reducing unsatisfied desires, for these theories the destruction of
belief in self results in a lessening of demandingness when the agent makes apparent
sacrifices for others.
The second part of the Buddhist demand-lessening strategy is referred to by
Vasubandhu when he claims that the bodhisattva takes the welfare of others to be
his own welfare. The bodhisattva has adjusted his conception of what matters so
that the tension between self and others is reduced. We see this to a limited
degree in a parent whose welfare depends partly on the flourishing of their child.
As a result of his realization of selflessness, the advanced bodhisattva’s concep-
tion of his identity has become extremely fluid. This allows him to take the role
of parent to all sentient beings, fully identifying his welfare with theirs. The
result is psychological transformation that, on most plausible theories of well-
being, connects the well-being of the bodhisattva with those she serves. First, she
experiences great joy when sentient beings are liberated from suffering. Second,
she desires the well-being of others, and successfully satisfies these desires by
aiding them. Since most plausible theories of well-being will give value to the
satisfaction of desires, or experiencing joyful mental states, this identification
with the needs of others will result in an increase in the well-being of the
bodhisattva when she successfully aids others.
Śāntideva, the Buddhist monk whom I argued above faces the overdemandingness
objection, writes in detail about this psychological transformation, in which concern for
one’s own well-being is replaced by concern for others. In the verses below, he
describes how the bodhisattva, upon realizing selflessness, shifts his concern to the
well-being of others.
Just as the notion of a self with regard to one’s own body, which has no personal
existence, is due to habituation, will the identity of one’s self with others not arise
out of habituation in the same way? (BCA 8:115)
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Therefore, just as you wish to protect yourself from pain, grief and the like, so
may you cultivate a spirit of protection and a spirit of compassion toward the
world. (BCA 8: 117)
In these passages, we see Śāntideva deploy the extreme psychological flexibility that
follows elimination of belief in an enduring self, by urging his reader to identify with
other persons as if they were oneself. The result is that great compassion and concern
for their welfare arises. Śāntideva also describes in detail the many sufferings that result
from attachment to the self. In the verse below, he combines the claim that eliminating
self cherishing reduces my own suffering with the claim that identifying our well-being
with that of others brings us great joy.
All those who are unhappy in the world are so as a result of their desire for their
own happiness. All those who are happy in the world are so as a result of their
desire for the happiness of others. (BCA 8: 129)
Śāntideva provides a number of meditations and arguments to help us value the
well-being of others as much as our own, such as this one, in which he draws our
attention to the suffering that others experience.
One should first earnestly meditate on the equality of oneself and others in this
way: ‘All equally experience suffering and happiness, and I must protect them as
I do myself’ (BCA 8: 90).
In a particularly powerful pair of verses, he links what appears to be the ultimate
sacrifice of descending into hell in order to liberate sentient beings with the great joy
the bodhisattva experiences when these beings are freed from suffering.
Thus, those whose mind-streams are cultivated in meditation and who equally
accept the suffering of others dive into the Avīci hell like swans into a pool of
lotuses (BCA 8: 107).
They become oceans of joy when sentient beings are liberated. Have they not
found fulfillment? What is the use of insipid liberation? (BCA 8: 108, translation
altered)24
Although the image of the bodhisattva joyfully descending into hell beautifully
illustrates Śāntideva’s linkage of benevolence and self-interest, it also raises an obvious
objection to his strategy. The bodhisattva’s embracement of these apparently extreme
demands might seem a fantasy of self-flagellation, rather than a praiseworthy ideal of
personal perfection. The initial response to this concern is to point out that the basic
strategy of psychological transformation employed by Mahāyāna Buddhists is an
24 mucyamāneṣu sattveṣu ye te prāmodyasāgarāh
˙
taireva nanu paryāptam˙ mokṣeṇārasikena kim. Śāntideva
2001, pps. 192–193. I translate arasika as insipid, rather than adopt the Wallace and Wallace translation of
sterile, to bring out the literal meaning of without flavor. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this
change.
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intuitively plausible way of at least somewhat lessening demandingness. We can see
this by using everyday examples, such as the parent caring for the child or the cheerful
volunteer taking great joy while giving up his Sunday afternoon in service. Surely, it is
plausible to claim that a well-off donor, signing away a modest portion of a paycheck to
a scholarship fund, while taking great pride in having increased educational accessi-
bility, has contributed to the flourishing of his own life?
Many of us will judge, however, that there are limits to the level of time and
resources that an individual can contribute before putting her own flourishing into
jeopardy. One concern, here, is the possibility of psychologically deluding ourselves
about how much it is healthy for us to give. Theories of welfare would characterize this
concern in different ways. For example, a hedonism might give the agent welfare credit
for an initial burst of manic generosity, but this would be outweighed by regret, as well
as distress from future lack of resources. In response, the Buddhist can claim that when
belief in an enduring self is completely eliminated, because selfishness is eradicated,
future regrets will not arise and mental distress from future poverty will be minimal or
nonexistent. What this shows is that although the Buddhist strategy of demand-
lessening is itself sound, the Buddhist’s radical use of it depends upon controversial
assumptions about the psychological effects of realizing that no enduring self exists.
A second concern arises if we accept a theory of well-being that marks as particu-
larly valuable pursuits like artistic achievement, career success, time spent with family,
and so on. An objective list theory might grant these items intrinsic value, while a
desire-satisfaction or hedonic theory might claim achieving these types of goals, or
experiencing the pleasure associated with them has a particularly high welfare value.
The concern now is that the requirements of the bodhisattva path will not allow us to
pursue these items. Even if we grant that the satisfaction taken from helping others has
welfare value for the individual, this will be outweighed by the loss of these welfare-
contributing items.25
Again, the Buddhist response will depend on a controversial principle, this time the
Buddhist analysis of ordinary existence as saturated by subtle forms of suffering
(duh
˙
kha). The Buddhist will claim that family relationships, career success, artistic
achievements, and so forth, when pursued by a mind filled with craving for perma-
nence, can never provide any lasting satisfaction. Therefore, giving them up will be
much less of a loss to well-being than it might appear. Evaluating the plausibility of the
Buddhist analysis of suffering, or their claims about the psychological effects of
realizing the nonexistence of an enduring self, go beyond my present purposes. We
can, however, conclude that the Buddhist strategy of demand-lessening is itself sound,
but keep in mind that the extent to which Buddhists employ it depends upon the
acceptance of these potentially controversial presuppositions.
Conclusion
In this essay, I have argued that Mahāyāna Buddhism as a whole shares an interest in
reducing the demandingness of the bodhisattva path, and that Śāntideva, in particular,
25 Susan Wolf (1982) develops this kind of an objection to moral sainthood in her influential article, ‘Moral
Saints.’
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faces the welfare-sacrificing version of the overdemandingness problem. I next sur-
veyed a number of contemporary responses to the overdemandingness problem and
suggested that they would not be acceptable to Śāntideva, since they either allow
abandonment of the root bodhisattva commitment to liberate all sentient beings from
suffering, or do not result in an actual lessening of demandingness. I suggested,
however, that Mahāyāna Buddhism is compatible with a demand-lessening strategy
dependent upon psychological transformations that bring the interests of oneself and
others into alignment. I then showed that this strategy occurs in passages by the
Buddhist philosophers Vasubandhu and Śāntideva. I argued that this demand-
lessening strategy does, plausibly, reduce demandingness, but that the radical reduction
claimed by Buddhist authors is believable only if we accept controversial claims about
the psychological effects of realizing the nonexistence of an enduring self and the
pervasion of ordinary existence by subtle forms of suffering.
Buddhist texts do not explicitly formulate and respond to the overdemandingness
objection. Nevertheless, Mahāyāna Buddhists were aware that the apparent demand-
ingness of the bodhisattva’s commitments created a tension in their moral system, and
they developed sophisticated demand-lessening strategies in response. Looking at these
Buddhist responses alongside contemporary literature on demandingness helps us to
appreciate the philosophical sophistication existing just beneath the surface of these
texts. As I have tried to show, the Mahāyāna tradition had developed the resources to
provide a powerful response to the overdemandingness objection, even though this
criticism was never explicitly raised against them by their traditional opponents.
A second benefit from this comparative study is the attention it brings to a relatively
neglected strategic response to the overdemandingness objection. Although authors like
Nagel have mentioned the possibility of bringing one’s psychological responses into
line with what a moral theory demands, no author to my knowledge has chosen to
develop this insight. Instead, contemporary ethicists tend to focus on restructuring the
theory of right action, in order to lessen the demands a moral theory makes on its
adherents. A sizable literature has developed illustrating the drawbacks of making these
various modifications. 26 A benefit of the psychological transformation demand-
lessening approach, by contrast, is its compatibility with multiple normative theories
and conceptions of well-being, and therefore its ability to leave the deep structure of an
ethical theory intact. Unlike contemporary authors, Buddhist texts develop this
demand-lessening strategy with great sophistication, employing a dual strategy of
eliminating selfish desires, while transferring concern for self to concern for others.
Finally, my study illustrates that, at its ground level, much of Buddhist ethical theory
stands or falls depending on the plausibility of its key presuppositions, in this case the
psychological effects of realizing selflessness and the pervasion of ordinary experience
by suffering. If we grant these presuppositions, I have argued that the bodhisattva may
be able to get all the way to hell without experiencing a great loss to her overall well-
being. Of course, this does not mean we should grant the Buddhist these presupposi-
tions. I hope, however, to have helped demonstrate the importance they play in
Buddhist moral thought.
26 See Mulgan 2001, especially chaps. 1–6, for a survey and development of some of these problems.
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